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Abstract
We examine conflict resolution via a random device. We model conflict as a two-agent
rent-seeking contest for a fixed prize. Before conflict arises, both agents may agree to allocate
the prize by coin flip to avoid the costs of conflict. In equilibrium, risk-neutral agents with
relatively symmetric conflict capabilities agree to resolve the conflict by randomization.
However, with sufficiently asymmetric capabilities, conflicts are unavoidable because the
stronger agent prefers to fight. Laboratory experiments confirm that the availability of the
random device partially eliminates conflicts when agents are relatively symmetric; however, the
device also reduces conflict between substantially asymmetric agents.
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1. Introduction
In archaic Greece, representatives from powerful city-states would travel to remote
Delphi to consult the Oracle housed at a temple dedicated to the god Apollo. The Oracle, a
priestess believed to be possessed by Apollo, provided advice to visitors about controversial
political matters by responding to questions that typically could be answered with a “yes” or
“no” response, and owing partly to the Oracle’s divine connection, the city-states would abide
by its counsel (Bowden, 2005). Iannaccone et al. (2011) argue that the purpose of the Oracle, as
well as other forms of institutionalized divination, was to resolve problematic and potentially
costly disputes through a multilateral commitment to the outcome of a randomization device.
Consider a (hypothetical) dispute between Athens and Sparta over a piece of territory,
where the alternative to abiding by the Oracle’s proposed allocation is armed conflict. In this
context, adherence to the decision of the Oracle constitutes a surplus-preserving solution to a
multi-player contest where agents (city-states) are relatively equally powerful. With relatively
equal opponents, the potential cost of conflict may overwhelm the gains to deviation from the
Oracle’s decision. Hence, the small and autonomous city-states have a strong interest in
supporting a randomizing Oracle.
Historically mechanisms of divination took many forms, including divining rods, the
casting of lots, and the inspired interpretation of cracks in fire-heated bones or of ominous
patterns observed in other media ranging from freshly spread entrails to wafting smoke
(Bernstein, 1996; Bowden, 2005). Regardless of the mechanism, willingness to submit to its
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outcome can be viewed as a strategic choice to avoid potentially costly conflict.1 More familiar
examples of conflict resolution via random device are abundant. Rock-paper-scissors, drawing
straws, and throwing dice settle many friendly disputes, like who gets to sit in the front seat on
a road trip, or who gets the top bunk bed in a dorm room.
However, even today the stakes can be high: Recently, a judge in Florida required
lawyers on opposing sides of a case to settle a disagreement by rock-paper-scissors, and the
auction houses of Sotheby’s and Christie’s played the game to determine who would receive a
contract to sell $17.8 million worth of art.2 In some political jurisdictions, a coin flip decides the
outcome of elections in which two candidates receive equal numbers of votes, and in other
jurisdictions coin flips are employed to determine the recipient of a government contract when
two companies tender equal offers (Lissau, 2011). Similarly, conflicting parties frequently
consent to third-party arbitration (Burgess et al., 1996; Szymanski, 2003) in order to avoid the
costs of going to court.
Returning to our example, consider a situation in which the power of Sparta is
ascendant and that of Athens on the decline. When Sparta grows sufficiently strong, it no
longer benefits from commitment to a random device. If the gains to conflict are sufficient,
then random decisions by the Oracle can only handcuff Sparta’s ambition.3 Although it is clear
why the random device may work as a surplus-preserving commitment mechanism, it is not
1

Another well-known historical example of commitment to what might be considered a random device is the
battlefield agreement to settle a conflict by single combat between two renowned warriors. Such combat is
attested in myth (e.g., combat described in the Iliad between Menelaus and Paris and between Achilles and
Hector) and numerous historical wars (e.g., the Battle of Clastidium 222 BC, the Battle of Badr 624 AD, the Battle of
the Trench 627 AD, to name a few). Similarly, Leeson (2010) describes the medieval mechanism of “trial by battle”
through which uncertain property rights were frequently assigned.
2
See the following news article from the AP: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/13221673/ns/us_news-weird_news/
3
Indeed, as Greece became a unified empire it no longer had need of the Delphic Oracle for political purposes. As
such by the third century BCE the Oracle was used mainly for religious and personal inquiries (Bowden 2005).
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obvious why agents, committed ex ante to the result of the coin flip, would follow through on
such a commitment after observing an ex post unfavorable decision by the random device. One
way to ensure that agents follow the commitment can be through binding contracts, such as
the Sotheby’s rock-paper-scissors example. In such a case, agents could sign a contract ex ante
that would commit them ex post to follow the result of the random device. A similar
mechanism is employed in the aforementioned election and contract assignment rules (Lissau,
2011).
However, agents cannot always enter binding contracts. As in our historical example, it
is unclear what would prevent Athens from rejecting the Oracle’s counsel and fighting Sparta
anyway if Sparta was favored by the decision. Two reasons why agents committed to the
Oracle’s decisions in ancient times were (1) historical context and the perceived ‘mystical’
nature of such decisions (Iannaccone et al., 2011), and (2) reputational concerns resulting from
repeated interaction with one another and with the Oracle (Dellarocas, 2006). Similar
reputational factors may be at work in some of the lighthearted examples of commitment to
randomization we described above. Whether commitment to the random device mechanism is
binding or non-binding, such mechanisms are prevalent in daily life and are often employed in
modern economics, politics and law.
Motivated by historical awe-inspiring examples and modern mundane practices, we
theoretically and experimentally examine individual willingness to resolve conflicts by
commitment to a random device. We alter both the availability of a random device and the
relative strength of players in four treatments where we model conflict as a variation of the
classic Tullock (1980) rent-seeking contest between two agents. In our setup, two agents face
3

the prospect of a conflict over a valuable prize. Before the conflict arises both participants may
agree to settle the dispute by flipping a coin (an Oracle) and thereby avoiding the costs of the
contest. We show analytically that if agents are relatively symmetric, then conflicts will be
avoided through appeals to the Oracle. However, when agents are substantially asymmetric
then conflicts are unavoidable because the stronger agent has no incentive to consent to
randomization. In laboratory experiments subject behavior is largely consistent with the
predictions: the introduction of a random commitment device reduces conflict, and the
reduction is significantly greater (though not complete) when agents are more symmetric. Thus,
although the costs of conflict are not always avoided when the theory predicts that they will be,
they are nevertheless frequently avoided when theory predicts that they will not.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we briefly review the
literature on conflicts and conflict resolution; in section 3 we detail our theoretical results;
section 4 describes our experimental design, procedures and hypotheses; section 5 analyzes the
results of the experimental sessions; and section 6 concludes.

2. Background
A rich literature on conflict resolution in economics extends back to Schelling’s (1960)
Strategy of Conflict in which he applied the tools of game theory to identify the necessity of
credible commitment to avoiding conflict. Since Schelling, economists and others have
developed numerous models of conflict, all of which highlight the resources wasted when
conflict occurs (Konrad, 2009). One of the best-known conflict models is the rent-seeking

4

contest, first developed by Tullock (1980) and elaborated by Skaperdas (1996), in which agents
expend resources to increase their probabilities of winning a valuable prize. An agent’s
probability of winning equals his expenditure divided by the sum of all contestants’
expenditures, so an agent who expends more resources has a better chance of receiving the
prize. In equilibrium, all agents make positive expenditures; however, from the point of view of
society, all such expenditures are wasteful. Moreover, laboratory experiments testing this
model indicate that in practice the costs of conflict are even higher than predicted by the
theory (Davis and Reilly, 1998; Potters et al., 1998; Fonseca, 2009; Sheremeta and Zhang, 2010;
Mago et al., 2011; Morgan et al., 2011; Sheremeta, 2011).
Given the high costs of conflict both in theory and practice, a number of mechanisms for
inducing commitment have been proposed, ranging from deterrence via extensive armament
(Schelling, 1960) and hostage exchange (Williamson, 1985) to contractually binding sidepayments (Charness et al., 2007; Schoonbeek, 2009; Kimbrough and Sheremeta, 2011). The
common property of all such conflict resolution mechanisms is that they seek to alter payoffs in
a way that eliminates the incentive for one party to unilaterally initiate conflict. In general, any
mechanism that provides all potential combatants with an expected payoff at least as large as
their expected payoff from conflict is preferable to outright conflict. Hence, in a dispute over an
indivisible resource, random assignment, or assignment by means of an “uncorrelated
asymmetry”, that is, some asymmetry between players that is uncorrelated with their
probabilities of winning a conflict, e.g. first possession (see Maynard-Smith, 1982), can be
supported as a Nash equilibrium.

5

Here we explore the decision to employ a random device (hereafter the Oracle) to avoid
costly conflict in a Tullock contest. Prior to the conflict, both parties can elect to bind
themselves to the decision of the Oracle. If both parties elect to adhere to the Oracle, then the
contest prize is awarded randomly and no conflict ensues. Otherwise, if one or both of the
parties elect not to use the Oracle, then the two parties engage in a Tullock contest to assign
the prize.

3. The Oracle Model
Consider a game of potential conflict between two risk-neutral players for a prize valued
at v by both players. We define the game in two sequential stages, the Oracle stage and the
conflict stage. In the Oracle stage, players 1 and 2 simultaneously decide whether to resolve the
conflict by flipping a fair coin or to enter the conflict stage.4 If both players agree to the coin
flip, then the game ends with neither player advancing to the conflict stage. The prize is
allocated to each player with probability p1Oracle = p2Oracle = 0.5, and players 1 and 2 receive the
expected payoffs of E(π1Oracle) = E(π2Oracle) = v/2. However, if either player refuses to abide by
the outcome of the coin flip, then both players advance to the conflict stage.
In the conflict stage, both players make irreversible effort expenditures e1 and e2 to
increase their probabilities of receiving the prize. Players have different conflict capabilities
(strengths) ai (a1 > a2), so that the stronger player 1 can expend the same effort, yet have a
higher chance of winning the prize. Specifically, player i’s probability of winning is defined by
the following contest success function (Skaperdas, 1996):
4

Oracle

The model can be easily extended to an unfair coin, i.e. p1
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Oracle

≠ p2

.

pi(e1, e2) = aiei /(a1e1 + a2e2).

(1)

The expected payoff for player i is equal to the probability of player i winning, pi(e1, e2),
times the prize valuation, v, minus contest expenditure, ei:
E(πi) = pi(e1, e2)v - ei.

(2)

By differentiating (2) and solving the best response functions simultaneously, we obtain
unique Nash equilibrium effort expenditure levels for players 1 and 2:
e1* = va1a2/(a1+a2)2 and e2* = va1a2/(a1+a2)2.

(3)

Given the equilibrium effort expenditures (3), the probabilities of winning the contest by
players 1 and 2 are:
p1* = a1/(a1+a2) and p2* = a2/(a1+a2).

(4)

The expected payoffs of players 1 and 2 in the equilibrium are:
E(π1*) = va12/(a1+a2)2 and E(π2*) = va22/(a1+a2)2.

(5)

Hence, the contest is both individually costly to the loser and socially costly because all
conflict stage expenditures are wasted. As a result, if both players possess complete knowledge
of the game’s structure and incentives, they may prefer to avoid the conflict stage by consulting
the Oracle (flipping the coin).5 In fact, the weaker player 2 will always choose the Oracle over
the conflict, since his expected payoff in the case of conflict is lower than in the case of a coin
flip, i.e. E(π2*) = va22/(a1+a2)2 < va22/(a2+a2)2 = v/4 < v/2 = E(π2Oracle). However, the choice of
player 1 crucially depends on how much stronger player 1 is than player 2. In particular, player
1 will choose the coin flip only if E(π1*) = va12/(a1+a2)2 ≤ v/2 = E(π1Oracle), or when a2 ≥ (√2-1)a1.

5

One can interpret the Oracle stage as players bargaining to determine the form of the contest success function,
i.e. either completely noisy or lottery contest success function.
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Hence, our theory predicts that if players’ capabilities are relatively symmetric, then
conflicts will be avoided through appeals to the Oracle.6 However, when the asymmetry is
substantial then conflicts are unavoidable because the stronger party will always choose to
enter the conflict. Note that if we increase the probability that the Oracle assigns the prize to
the stronger player, i.e. p1Oracle > p2Oracle, we can again create an Oracle that both players would
prefer over conflict. Indeed, because a randomization device is always surplus-preserving, there
exists an Oracle that would be preferred by both players for any costly conflict situation. Even if
the Oracle itself is costly to setup or to maintain, it is preferable by both players as long as
individual costs of creating and maintaining the Oracle are less than individual benefits of
avoiding conflicts through the Oracle, i.e. c1 ≤ E(π1Oracle) - E(π1

Conflict

) and c2 ≤ E(π2Oracle) -

E(π2Conflict). In what follows we explore the simplest case in which the Oracle allocates the prize
by flipping a fair coin (p1Oracle = p2Oracle = 0.5) and there are no costs of maintaining the Oracle (c1
= c2 = 0).

4. Experimental Design and Procedures
We employ four treatments to test the predictions of our theory: Baseline-Unbalanced,
Baseline-Balanced, Oracle-Unbalanced, and Oracle-Balanced, where Unbalanced and Balanced
refer to the relative strengths of players 1 and 2. The outline of the experimental design and the
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In the relatively symmetric case, i.e. a2 ≥ (√2-1)a1, there is also a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which both
players simultaneously choose not to use the Oracle. Since the use of Oracle requires unilateral agreement, if one
player chooses not to use the Oracle then the other player might as well choose not to use it. However, it easy to
see that such subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is not strategically stable (Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986), and both
players can benefit from unilaterally deviating from it. In fact, we do not find any support for this equilibrium in our
data, as weak players almost always choose to use the Oracle.
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theoretical predictions for each treatment are shown in Table 1. In all treatments subjects
compete for a prize with value v = 100. In the Baseline-Unbalanced treatment, players 1 and 2
have substantially different strengths, i.e. a1 = 4 and a2 = 1. In equilibrium, the expenditures of
players 1 and 2 are e1* = 16 and e2* = 16, the probabilities of winning are p1* = 0.8 and p2* = 0.2,
and the expected payoffs are E(π1*) = 64 and E(π2*) = 4. In the Baseline-Balanced treatment,
players 1 and 2 have relatively symmetric strengths, i.e. a1 = 3/2 and a2 = 1. In equilibrium
players 1 and 2 expend e1* = 24 and e2* = 24, win the conflict with probabilities p1* = 0.6 and p2*
= 0.4, and earn expected payoffs of E(π1*) = 36 and E(π2*) = 16. Thus, the costs of conflict are
increasing in the relative symmetry of the players.7
The other two treatments, Oracle-Unbalanced and Oracle-Balanced introduce the
Oracle stage to the game, prior to the conflict stage. In the Oracle stage, players simultaneously
decide whether to flip a coin in order to determine the winner of the prize. In case of
disagreement or joint refusal to consult the Oracle, both treatments are equivalent to BaselineUnbalanced and Baseline-Balanced treatments. The equilibrium prediction in the OracleUnbalanced treatment is that conflict always occurs, because the stronger player 1 always
chooses to enter the conflict since E(π1*) = 64 > 50 = E(π1Oracle). On the other hand, in the
Oracle-Balanced treatment, conflict never occurs, because both players always agree to consult
the Oracle since E(π1*) = 36 < 50 = E(π1Oracle) .
Each experimental session consisted of 30 periods of a single treatment. Subjects were
randomly assigned the initial role of either player 1 or player 2, and each player 1 was matched
with a player 2. Subjects remained in this role and matched pair for the first 15 periods of the
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This result has long been recognized in the theoretical literature (Baik, 1994; Konrad, 2009).

9

session. Then all players 1 became players 2 and vice versa, and subjects were re-matched into
new pairs in which they remained for the final 15 periods.8 Each period, in the BaselineUnbalanced and Baseline-Balanced treatments subjects chose their expenditures, any number
between 0 and 100, in order to increase the probability of winning the prize of 100 francs. At
the end of each period, the computer displayed these expenditures, as well as corresponding
payoffs. In the Oracle-Unbalanced and Oracle-Balanced treatments, subjects first made their
decisions whether to flip a computerized coin in order to determine who would receive the
prize, or to enter the second stage conflict.9 The computer displayed subjects’ first stage
decisions. Then, if at least one of the paired players decided not to flip the coin, subjects
proceeded to the second stage where they chose their expenditures. At the end of each period,
the computer displayed individual decisions, as well as corresponding payoffs, to each subject.
After 30 periods, subjects also participated in a one period contest in which they could
expend resources to win a prize worth zero. This was done to elicit subjects’ non-monetary
value of winning. At the end of each experimental session, subjects completed a brief
demographic survey. To reinforce the one-shot incentives of the game, subjects knew
beforehand that we would randomly select 4 of the 30 periods for payment. At the end of the
session, subjects’ total earnings from these 4 periods less their expenditures for the zero value
prize were added to or subtracted from an initial endowment of 500 francs (which we
described as a participation fee). We converted francs to USD at a rate of 25 = $1, and subjects
8

This type of matching protocol was used to mitigate concerns about fairness and inequality among subjects. Also,
we wanted for subjects to have sufficient experience in each role before switching to another role. Finally, we
wanted to preserve contamination of subjects’ behavior in one session by outliers (alternatively, in a random
matching environment the presence of several outliers could substantially impact the behavior of all subjects in
the session).
9
One could also design an experiment to study non-binding Oracle agreements, where in a repeated-game setting
the loser may refuse to abide by the coin flip and instead engage in conflict.
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were paid privately in cash and dismissed from the experiment. Sessions lasted approximately
an hour each.
180 subjects were recruited at random from the subject pool consisting of graduate and
undergraduate students at a private university in the United States. Subjects were randomly
assigned into 8 experimental sessions (2 per treatment) with between 20 and 24 subjects each.
Subjects sat at, and interacted via, visually isolated computer terminals, and instructions were
read aloud by the experimenter as subjects followed along on paper. The experiments were
programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Before participating subjects took a quiz (nonincentivized) to confirm their understanding of the experimental procedures. Subjects received
their initial endowments for arriving to the experiment on time and received their earnings in
cash privately at the end of each session. The average experimental earnings, including the $20
participation fee, were $24.5, ranging from a low of $11.4 to a high of $35.6. No subject
participated more than once, and no subject had prior experience with a similar experimental
environment. Instructions for the Oracle-Unbalanced treatment are included in an appendix.
Instructions for the other treatments are available upon request.

5. Results
5.1.

The Impact of the Oracle on Surplus
The main research question of our study is whether the availability of the Oracle

reduces the cost of conflict and increases economic surplus. Table 2 displays summary statistics
for all four treatments. Comparing surpluses in Table 2, we find that surplus is 39% higher in the
11

Oracle-Unbalanced than the Baseline-Unbalanced treatment (76.1 versus 54.8), and it is 69%
higher in the Oracle-Balanced than the Baseline-Balanced treatment (75.8 versus 44.9). To
support this finding statistically, we estimate panel regressions separately for each of the
Unbalanced and Balanced treatments where the dependent variable is pairwise surplus,
defined as v - (e1 + e2) for each pair in each period, and the independent variables are a period
trend, a dummy-variable controlling for the last 15 periods after players switch roles, and a
dummy-variable for the presence of the Oracle. We include a random effects error structure for
the individual subjects to account for repeated measures, which is equivalent to group random
effects since surplus is measured at the level of the pair.
The estimation results are shown in Table 3. Mixed evidence on the significance of the
period trend indicates increasing surplus over time in the Unbalanced treatment, though not in
the Balanced treatment.10 The insignificant estimated effect of switching roles reveals the
absence of notable re-matching effects.
More important for our purposes, regressions (1) and (2) indicate that the effect of the
Oracle treatment on surplus is positive and significant for both treatments (p-values < 0.01).
However, relative to theoretical benchmarks, surplus in the Oracle-Unbalanced treatment is
significantly higher than predicted (76.1 versus 68); while in the Oracle-Balanced treatment, it is
significantly lower than predicted (75.8 versus 100).11 We summarize these findings in Result 1.

10

As we discuss further in Section 5.3, increasing surplus over time comes primarily from a decrease in strong
player conflict expenditures over time.
11
Separately for Oracle-Unbalanced and Oracle-Balanced treatments, we estimate random effects panel
regressions in which the dependent variable is surplus and the independent variables are a constant, a period
trend, and a dummy-variable controlling for switched roles. Wald test indicates that the estimated constant,
capturing surplus, is significantly higher than predicted in the Oracle-Unbalanced treatment (p-value = 0.02) and
significantly lower than predicted in the Oracle-Balanced treatment (p-value < 0.001).
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Result 1: The Oracle increases mean surplus in both treatments. However, the surplus is
significantly higher than predicted in the Oracle-Unbalanced treatment and significantly lower
in the Oracle-Balanced treatment.
Does the deviation from the theory derive from the entry decisions in the Oracle stage
or from expenditures in the conflict stage? The estimations of regressions (3) and (4) in Table 3
provide the first insight. These regressions use only those observations which resulted in
conflict. The estimated effect of the Oracle treatment is insignificant for both the Unbalanced
and Balanced treatments, indicating that higher surplus in the Oracle treatments mainly comes
from decisions not to enter the conflict; when conflict occurs in the Oracle treatments, it is
neither more nor less intense than conflict in the Baseline treatments. In the next section we
further analyze how entry decisions differ from theoretical predictions, therefore implicitly
shaping Result 1.

5.2.

Probability of a Conflict
The primary source of deviations between observed and predicted surplus in result (1) is

deviation from the predicted frequency of appeals to the Oracle to settle conflicts. In particular,
Table 2 reports that subjects in the Oracle-Balanced treatment employ the randomization
device with probability 0.63, although the theory predicts that no conflict will occur. On the
other hand, the Oracle-Unbalanced subjects appeal to the Oracle with probability 0.40, though
theory predicts that they will fight with probability 1. Figure 1 displays time series of conflict
entry probability by subject type, all of which are relatively stable over time. When conflict
occurs, the stronger player usually instigates, and the probability of entry by strong players is
13

higher in the Oracle-Unbalanced than the Oracle-Balanced treatment. Furthermore, most
weaker players choose not to enter conflict, regardless of their relative strength.
To support these observations, we estimate panel probit models with random effects
for each subject, where the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if a player chose to engage in
conflict and 0 otherwise. The independent variables are a constant term, a dummy-variable for
the weaker player 2, a period trend, and a dummy-variable controlling for switched roles after
period 15. Table 4 reports estimation results. Insignificant estimated coefficients of the period
trend and the role-switching dummy indicate no notable changes over time or as a result of rematching.12 Consistent with the comparative statics predictions of the model, the weaker
player 2 chooses to engage in a conflict significantly less often than the stronger player 1.
However, as noted above, the overall probability of a conflict is lower than the predicted value
of 1 in the Oracle-Unbalanced treatment and higher than 0 in the Oracle-Balanced treatment
(p-values < 0.01)13. Table 4 reports an additional estimation combining data from the OracleUnbalanced and Oracle-Balanced treatments (column 3). Again consistent with the comparative
statics predictions, the Unbalanced coefficient is positive, indicating that the probability of a
conflict increases in players’ asymmetry. We summarize these findings in Result 2.

12

These observations are generally robust to estimating the effects separately for each type. The slight upward
trend in the entry probability of stronger players in the Unbalanced treatment is weakly significant (p-value =
0.07).
13
To test these hypotheses, we estimate two linear probability panel regressions where the dependent variable
takes a value of 1 if a conflict occurred (i.e. if one or both members of the pair chose conflict) and a value of 0
otherwise. The dependent variables include a period trend and a dummy for the last 15 periods and we include
group specific random effects to control for repeated observations. Wald tests reject the hypothesized values of
the constant term. Regression output is unreported but available from the authors upon request.
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Result 2: The probability of a conflict is higher when players are more asymmetric.
There are significantly fewer conflicts than predicted in the Oracle-Unbalanced treatment and
significantly more conflicts in the Oracle-Balanced treatment.
These findings support our claim that the divergence between the observed and
predicted impact of the Oracle on surplus in both treatments (Result 1) can largely be traced to
differences between the observed and predicted probabilities of conflict (Result 2). There are
several potential explanations for why we observe “too little” conflict in the Oracle-Unbalanced
and “too much” conflict in the Oracle-Balanced treatment. First and most importantly, the
predicted probabilities of conflict are at the boundaries, so that in the Oracle-Unbalanced
treatment even one non-equilibrium choice of non-entry implies the average probability of
conflict less than one.14 Similarly, in the Oracle-Balanced treatment even one non-equilibrium
choice of entry implies the average probability of conflict more than zero. Thus, deviations from
the predictions can only be observed in one direction.
In addition, one could offer preference-based explanations of our observations. For
example, if subjects care about the (expected) payoffs of others, both inequality aversion (Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) and preferences for social efficiency (Charness
and Rabin, 2002) imply a lower expected probability of conflict. Given the strength asymmetry
in the Oracle-Unbalanced treatment, and the inequality of expected payoffs between stronger
and weaker players, inequality aversion would imply a diminished probability of entry by
stronger players (which we observe in our data). The expected effect of inequality aversion
would be smaller in the Oracle-Balanced treatment.
14

The problem of boundary equilibrium predictions has been well recognized in linear public good experiments,
where the Nash equilibrium is to contribute nothing. For a review see Laury and Holt (2008).
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Finally, it is also possible that some subjects are driven by “joy of winning” (Parco et al.
2005; Sheremeta, 2010) and/or spite (Herrmann and Orzen, 2008). If subjects’ entry decisions
are driven by joy of winning, then they should be more likely to enter the contest in general. 15 If
subjects are spiteful, they may seek to maximize payoff difference by reducing opponents’
payoffs (Leininger, 2003; Hehenkamp et al., 2004). In the Oracle-Balanced treatment, the only
way for the stronger player to reduce the weaker player’s payoff is by entering a conflict. On
the other hand, by design, payoff difference in the Oracle-Unbalanced treatment is already very
large, and thus the returns to additional spite are likely to be diminished by the already
substantial inequality of expected payoffs in equilibrium.
Whether inequality aversion, spite, joy of winning, or some other factors produce
deviations of individual entry decisions from point predictions, the comparative statics of the
Oracle model hold in our experiment, suggesting that commitment to a random device can
serve as an effective conflict resolution mechanism. This is encouraging, given that many earlier
experiments have documented very high costs of conflict (cf. Section 2 above). Indeed, the
same pattern emerges in our experiment. As we show in the next section, when conflict occurs,
the costs exceed the predictions of the theory.

15

Following Sheremeta (2010), after 30 periods of play, we elicited “joy of winning” by letting subjects make
expenditures in a conflict over a prize worth nothing. A novel feature of our design is that in the OracleUnbalanced and Oracle-Balanced treatments, subjects first make entry decisions, and then, upon entry into the
conflict stage, they choose their expenditure level. Thus, we can test whether joy of winning explains decisions to
enter the conflict. For that reason, we re-estimated models in Table 4, including joy of winning as an additional
independent variable. The estimation results are available from the authors upon request. When combining the
data for both treatments the joy of winning increases the probability of entry. However it appears to affect subject
types differently in different treatments. For example, there is a positive correlation between joy of winning and
entry for weaker players in both treatments, but for stronger players the correlation is positive in the Balanced
treatment and negative in the Unbalanced treatment. Since our experiment was not designed to study the joy of
winning, we are hesitant to draw any strong conclusions. Future research should carefully examine whether
expenditures for the prize of zero measure the desire to compete or the desire to win, or possibly both.
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5.3.

Expenditures
Table 2 reports mean expenditures in excess of the Nash equilibrium predictions for

both player types in all treatments, and Figure 2, which displays time series of mean individual
expenditure by role and treatment, also shows that the excess expenditures persist throughout
the experiment.
To examine the determinants of expenditures, we combine the data across treatments
and estimate a single panel regression in which the dependent variable is expenditure and the
independent variables are a dummy-variable for the weaker player 2, a period trend, a dummyvariable for the last 15 periods indicating the periods after roles have switched, Unbalanced and
Oracle treatment dummies, and a constant term. For the Oracle-Balanced and OracleUnbalanced treatments we restrict analysis to instances of conflict. As before, we include a
random effects error structure for the individual subjects to account for repeated measures.
Table 5 displays the output of this regression. As in the other regressions, the estimated
coefficients of the period trend and the role-switching dummy are insignificant, suggesting that
this finding is robust.16 Consistent with the theory, expenditures decrease as players become
more asymmetric (the coefficient on Unbalanced is negative and significant), and an
insignificant coefficient on the Weaker player dummy-variable indicates no significant
differences in expenditures between stronger players 1 and weaker players 2.17 One might
expect that the forgone opportunity to avoid the costs of conflict would induce retaliatory
16

However, if we include a separate period trend for each type, we find that stronger players in the Unbalanced
treatment reduce their conflict expenditures over time (p-value < 0.01); this suggests that some learning takes
place regarding the effects of relative strength on win probability.
17
As a robustness check, we have also re-estimated the regression in Table 5 including interactions between
Weaker and Unbalanced and between Weaker and Oracle to see whether expenditure of player 1 is different from
the expenditure of player 2 in the Unbalanced and/or Oracle treatment. Estimation results are very similar and the
interaction dummies are not significant.
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behavior by those subjects that chose not to enter but were dragged into conflict by their
counterpart. The insignificant effect of the Oracle treatment on conflict expenditures,
conditional on entry, indicates that conflict intensity remains unchanged in the presence of the
randomization device.18 Nevertheless, Wald tests reject the hypotheses that the constant term
is equal to 24 (the predicted expenditure in the Balanced treatments) and that the sum of the
constant and the Unbalanced dummy-variable is equal to 16 (the predicted expenditure in the
Unbalanced treatments) (p-values < 0.01).19 We summarize these findings in Result 3.
Result 3: Although subjects overinvest in conflict on average, expenditures of both types
are lower when players are more asymmetric. Furthermore, for a given asymmetry level, there
is no difference in expenditures between stronger and weaker players.
While our experiment was not designed to test this hypothesis in particular, the data
suggest that, ceteris paribus, conflict expenditures decline with relative strength asymmetry in
repeated Tullock contests, and this finding is consistent with a wider literature. For example, in
animal behavior studies, one common explanation for conflict behavior is based on “fighting
assessment” (Parker, 1974). So-called “mutual assessment” models hold that in resource
contests, animals assess the relative strength of their opponents, and upon recognizing an
unfavorable asymmetry they are less likely to expend resources in conflict, thereby reducing
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As a robustness check in the Oracle-Balanced and Oracle-Unbalanced treatments, we have also estimated
regressions controlling for the individual entry decisions in the Oracle stage. Estimation results are virtually the
same. As another robust check, we also re-estimate the regressions using lag variable of whether players engaged
in conflict in the past period or not. The effect of the lag is positive, but insignificant, and the other results are
unchanged except that the estimated period trend is now negative and significant (p-value = 0.03). All estimation
results are available from the authors upon request.
19
Prior studies have also found “joy of winning” to be a significant explanation for excess conflict expenditures
(Parco et al. 2005; Sheremeta 2010; Brookins and Ryvkin, 2010; Mago et al., 2011). We re-estimated Table 5
including joy of winning as an additional independent variable. The results for the main explanatory variables were
virtually the same, with the estimated coefficient of joy of winning being positive and significant.
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the total costs of conflict.20 Empirical evidence from a broad range of species shows that the
average length of resource contests is decreasing in the relative asymmetry of the competitors
(Arnott and Elwood, 2009). Finally, several recent experimental studies have also documented
that increasing players’ asymmetry reduces effort expenditures in diverse competitive
environments (Fonseca, 2009; Anderson and Freeborn, 2010; DeScioli and Wilson, in press).

6. Conclusion
Our model of conflict resolution between asymmetric contestants predicts that when
players are sufficiently symmetric, they will choose to settle their disputes by appealing to a
randomization device (the Oracle) in order to avoid the costs of conflict. On the other hand, if
players are sufficiently asymmetric, the stronger player will always choose outright conflict
because the benefits of conflict exceed the expected value of the random allocation. We test
the Oracle model in the laboratory with two treatments, one in which the players are relatively
Balanced and one in which they are Unbalanced. In keeping with previous studies of conflict we
find evidence that conflicts are generally more costly than expected, as conflict expenditures
are higher than predicted in all treatments. Also, consistent with previous animal behavior and
human subject research on the intensity of conflict with respect to the relative strength
asymmetry of the contestants, we find that expenditures are greater in the Balanced than in
the Unbalanced treatments. Most importantly, we find compelling evidence that the Oracle
reduces the costs of conflict in both treatments: when agents are relatively symmetric, the
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As the Kenny Rogers lyric famously says, “You gotta know when to hold ‘em, know when to fold ‘em…”
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Oracle increases average surplus by 69%, and when they are relatively asymmetric, it still
increases average surplus by 39%.
Our results highlight the power of commitment to a randomization device as a surpluspreserving conflict resolution mechanism and explain both historical and modern
implementations ranging from the casting of lots and reading of tea leaves to rock-paperscissors. Many superficially mystifying practices that appear absurd to modern eyes can be
revealed to serve similar purposes, and the history of economic and political institutions may
benefit from studying such mechanisms in this light.
Both the data and the theory suggest a number of interesting experimental extensions.
For example, one could explore how much subjects would be willing to pay (in tribute) to
maintain an Oracle; the theoretical willingness to pay is noted in Section 3, but if there exists a
threshold for provision of the Oracle as a public good, then the collective action problem may
reduce the likelihood of surplus preserving solutions. On the other hand, one could ask whether
various side-payment schemes would increase the willingness of strong players to consent to
the randomization device, and if subjects can bargain over the Oracle’s assignment
probabilities, the observed surplus gains may be extended to even more asymmetric
environments.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Experimental Design and Theoretical Predictions
Treatment
Player
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2

Strength, ai
*

Expenditure, ei
*

Probability, pi

*

Expected Payoff, E(πi )
Individual Probability of
Choosing Conflict
Probability of a Conflict
Surplus

BaselineUnbalanced
4
1
16
16
0.80
0.20
64
4
N/A
N/A
1.00
68

BaselineBalanced
3/2
1
24
24
0.60
0.40
36
16
N/A
N/A
1.00
52

OracleUnbalanced
4
1
16
16
0.80
0.20
64
4
1.00
0.00
1.00
68

OracleBalanced
3/2
1
24
24
0.60
0.40
36
16
0.00
0.00
0.00
100

Table 2: Average Statistics
Treatment

*

Expenditure, ei
*

Probability, pi

*

Expected Payoff, E(πi )

Player
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2

Individual Probability of
Choosing Conflict
Probability of a Conflict
Surplus
Standard Errors in Parentheses.

BaselineUnbalanced
21.4 (0.8)
23.7 (1.1)
0.77 (0.02)
0.23 (0.02)
55.2 (1.7)
-0.4 (1.6)
N/A
N/A
1.00
54.8 (1.5)
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BaselineBalanced
27.9 (0.8)
27.2 (0.9)
0.61 (0.02)
0.39 (0.02)
33.1 (1.8)
11.8 (1.8)
N/A
N/A
1.00
44.9 (1.4)

OracleUnbalanced
17.8 (0.7)
19.7 (1.2)
0.80 (0.02)
0.20 (0.02)
61.7 (2.1)
0.8 (1.8)
0.60 (0.02)
0.06 (0.01)
0.63 (0.02)
76.1 (1.2)

OracleBalanced
31.8 (1.7)
28.4 (1.8)
0.64 (0.03)
0.36 (0.03)
32.4 (3.1)
7.4 (2.9)
0.33 (0.02)
0.13 (0.01)
0.40 (0.02)
75.8 (1.6)

Table 3: The Impact of the Oracle on Group Surplus
Regression
Dependent Variable

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Surplus
Balanced
Unbalanced
-0.082
0.713***
(0.175)
(0.179)
5.549
-3.954
(6.543)
(6.071)
30.96***
6.150
(5.939)
(5.461)
43.36***
45.76***
(4.815)
(5.467)
1380
1090
92
86

Unbalanced
Balanced
0.502**
-0.243
(0.163)
(0.182)
-3.722
4.918
(5.935)
(8.476)
21.31***
-10.41
(5.478)
(8.495)
48.91***
46.18***
(5.231)
(6.739)
Observations
1320
967
Number of groups
88
80
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Panel models (1)-(4) include individual subject random effects.
Regressions (3) and (4) use only those observations which resulted in conflict.
Period
[period trend]
Switch
[1 if period > 15]
Oracle
[1 if Oracle]
Constant

Table 4: Individual Probability of Choosing Conflict
Regression
Dependent Variable

(1)

(2)

(3)

Probability of a Conflict
OracleOracleUnbalanced
Balanced
Oracle
Weaker
-2.002***
-1.010***
-1.524***
[1 if player 2]
(0.103)
(0.100)
(0.071)
Period
0.012
-0.001
0.005
[period trend]
(0.011)
(0.011)
(0.007)
Switch
-0.098
-0.350
-0.232
[1 if period > 15]
(0.189)
(0.188)
(0.132)
Unbalanced
0.600**
[1 if Unbalanced]
(0.214)
Constant
0.156
-0.543**
-0.464**
(0.15)
(0.209)
(0.167)
Observations
1260
1380
2640
Number of groups
42
46
88
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Panel probit models (1)-(3) include individual subject random effects.
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Table 5: Determinants of Expenditure
(1)

Regression
Dependent Variable

Expenditure
All Treatments
0.600
(1.450)
-0.152
(0.092)
-0.682
(1.879)
-7.753**
(2.483)
-0.569
(2.502)
31.351***
(2.317)
4114
177

Weaker
[1 if player 2]
Period
[period trend]
Switch
[1 if period > 15]
Unbalanced
[1 if Unbalanced]
Oracle
[1 if Oracle]
Constant

Observations
Number of groups
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Panel model (1) includes individual subject random effects.
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Figure 1: Time Series of Mean Probability of Choosing Conflict by Role, Oracle Treatments

Figure 2: Time Series of Mean Expenditure by Role and Treatment
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Appendix – Instructions for the Oracle-Unbalanced Treatment
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
This is an experiment in the economics of strategic decision-making. Various research agencies have
provided funds for this research. If you follow the instructions closely and make appropriate decisions,
you and the other participants in this experiment can earn an appreciable amount of money, which will
be paid to you in cash.
The currency used in the experiment is francs. Francs will be converted to U.S. Dollars at a rate of _25_
francs to _1_ dollar. You have already earned a $20.00 participation fee (this includes the $7 show up
fee). The experiment will consist of 30 periods and at the end of the experiment we will randomly
choose 4 of the 30 periods for actual payment. We will sum your total earnings for these 4 periods and
convert them to a U.S. dollar payment.
It is very important that you remain silent and do not look at others’ decisions (screens). If you have any
questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you.
If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc..., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect
and appreciate you following the laboratory's rules. The remainder of the instructions will describe the
decisions you may face in each period.
The participants in today’s experiment will be randomly assigned into two-person groups. In addition to
the group assignment each participant will also be randomly assigned to a specific type in the group,
designated as Person 1 or Person 2. You and the other participant in your group will make choices that
will determine your payoffs. The experiment contains 30 rounds. You will remain within the same twoperson group as the same type for 15 rounds. Thereafter you will be regrouped with another participant
into a new group where you will be a different type (i.e., if you were Person 1 in the first 15 rounds, you
will be Person 2 for the last 15 rounds, and vice-versa).
In each round of the experiment either Person 1 or Person 2 will receive the reward. The reward is
worth 100 francs. Each round of the experiment consists of two decision stages. In Stage 1, you and the
other person in your group will decide on a specific way to determine who will receive the reward.
YOUR DECISION IN STAGE 1
In each round, both participants will have the opportunity to choose whether they want to flip a
computer coin in order to determine who will receive the reward. An example of your decision screen is
shown below.
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EARNINGS
If both participants choose to flip a computer coin, the round is over. The flip outcome determines who
receives the reward. There is a 50% chance the coin lands heads, and 50% chance the coin lands tails. If
the computer coin lands heads Person 1 receives the reward, if it lands tails, Person 2 receives the
reward. So, there are two possible payoffs:
If You Receive the Reward
Earnings = 100 francs
If The Other Person Receives the Reward
Earnings = 0 francs
If you want to flip the coin, check `Yes’. However, if either Person 1 or Person 2 chooses to not flip, by
checking `No’, then both participants will enter Stage 2. At the end of the experiment we will randomly
select four out of 30 periods for payment--two from the first 15 periods and two from the last 15
periods.
YOUR DECISION IN STAGE 2
If either person chooses to enter stage 2 by checking ‘No’, each person may bid for the 100 franc
reward. You may bid any integer number of francs between 0 and 100. An example of your decision
screen is shown below.
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EARNINGS IN STAGE 2
After both participants make their bids, your earnings for the period are calculated. Regardless of who
receives the reward, both participants will have to pay their bids. So your earnings will be calculated in
the following way:
If you receive the reward:
Earnings in Stage 2 = 100 – Your Bid
If you do not receive the reward:
Earnings in Stage 2 = 0 – Your Bid
Remember you have already earned a $20.00 participation fee (equivalent to 500 francs). In any period,
you may receive either positive or negative earnings. At the end of the experiment we will randomly
select four out of 30 periods for payment--two from the first 15 periods and two from the last 15
periods. We will sum the total earnings for these four periods and convert them to a U.S. dollar
payment. If the summed earnings are negative, we will subtract them from your participation fee. If the
summed earnings are positive, we will add them to your participation fee.
What Does my Bid Mean?
The more you bid, the more likely you are to receive the reward. The more the other person bids, the
less likely you are to receive the reward. Specifically:
For each franc Person 1 bids Person 1 receives 8 lottery tickets
For each franc Person 2 bids Person 2 receives 2 lottery tickets
At the end of each period the computer draws randomly one ticket among all the tickets purchased by
you and the other person. The owner of the winning ticket receives the reward of 100 francs. Each
ticket has an equal chance of winning. So your chance of receiving the reward is given by the number of
tickets you buy divided by the total number of tickets bought by you and the other person.
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Your Total Lottery Tickets
Chance of Receiving the Reward =
Sum of Your and Other Person’s Lottery Tickets
If both participants bid zero the reward is randomly assigned to one of the two participants.
Determining Who Wins The Reward
This is a hypothetical example used to illustrate how the computer determines who wins the reward of
100 francs. If Person 1 bids 20 francs and Person 2 bids 20 francs, then Person 1 receives 160 lottery
tickets and Person 2 receives 40 lottery tickets. Then the computer randomly draws one lottery ticket
out of 200 (160 + 40). As you can see, Person 1 has a higher chance of receiving the reward, 0.80 =
160/200. Person 2 has a 0.20 = 40/200 chance of receiving the reward.
After both participants bid, the computer will make a random draw that will determine who receives the
reward. Then the computer will calculate your period earnings based on your bid and whether you
received the reward or not. At the end of each period, you will see:
1. Whether you chose to flip a coin and whether the other person chose to flip a coin,
2. If applicable, how much you bid and how much the other person bid,
3. Whether you received the reward or not, and
4. Your earnings for the period.
Once the outcome screen is displayed you should record your results for the period on your Personal
Record Sheet under the appropriate heading. An example of the outcome screen is shown below.

IMPORTANT NOTES
You will not be told which of the participants in this room are assigned to which two-person group. The
group stays intact for 15 periods. At the end of 15 periods you will be randomly re-grouped with a
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different participant to form a new two-person group for another 15 periods. At the beginning of each
period you will be told if you are Person 1 or Person 2. You will be Person 1 in half of the periods and
Person 2 in half of the periods. You can never guarantee yourself the reward. If both participants choose
to flip a computer coin in stage 1, then the reward is assigned randomly. If either person chooses not to
flip a computer coin, then both participants proceed to stage 2. In stage 2, by increasing your bid you
can increase your chance of receiving the reward.

Quiz

1.
2.
3.
4.

Before starting, we want you to answer some questions regarding the experiment to be sure you
understand what will follow. After five minutes an experimenter will return to privately review your
answers.
You will be Person 1 in how many of the periods?
You always have to bid more than zero (true or false)?
Your bid will be subtracted from your earnings (true or false)?
If both participants agree to the coin flip, what is the chance of Person 1 winning the reward?

5. Imagine Person 1 bids 1 franc and Person 2 bids 1 franc. What is the chance of Person 1 winning
the reward?
6. Imagine Person 1 bids 2 francs and Person 2 bids 8 francs. What is the chance of Person
winning the reward?
7. Imagine Person 1 bids 8 francs and Person 2 bids 16 francs. What is the chance of Person
winning the reward?
8. Imagine Person 1 bids 18 francs and Person 2 bids 24 francs. What is the chance of Person
winning the reward?
9. Imagine Person 1 bids 18 francs and Person 2 bids 72 francs. What is the chance of Person
winning the reward?
10. Imagine Person 1 bids 0 francs and Person 2 bids 1 franc. What is the chance of Person
winning the reward?

1
1
1
1
1

The following instructions handed out and read aloud after subjects participated in the prior experiment.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART II
This part of the experiment consists of only one decision-making period and only one stage. The rules
for this part are similar to the rules for part I. Francs will be converted to U.S. Dollars at a rate of _25_
francs to _1_ dollar. Participants will be randomly assigned into two-person groups. In addition to the
group assignment each participant will also be randomly assigned to a specific type in the group,
designated as Person 1 or Person 2.
You will bid in order to be a winner. The only difference is that in this part the winner receives a reward
of zero. The reward is worth 0 francs to you and the other person in your group. After everyone have
made their decisions your earnings for the period are calculated:
Earnings = 0 – Your Bid
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The more you bid, the more likely you are to be the winner. The more the other person in your group
bids, the less likely you are to be the winner. Specifically:
For each franc Person 1 bids Person 1 receives 8 lottery tickets
For each franc Person 2 bids Person 2 receives 2 lottery tickets
After both participants submit their bids, the computer draws randomly one ticket among all the tickets
purchased by you and the other person. Each ticket has an equal chance of winning. So your chance of
being the winner is given by the number of tickets you buy divided by the total number of tickets bought
by you and the other person in your group.
Chance of Being the Winner=Your Total Lottery Tickets divided by the Sum of Your and Other Person’s
Lottery Tickets
If both people bid zero, the designation of winner is randomly assigned to one of the two people in the
group.
After everyone has made his or her decision, you will learn whether you win or not. The computer then
will display your earnings on the outcome screen. Both people will have to pay their bids. Your earnings
will be converted to cash and paid at the end of the experiment.
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